When the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) decided to refer the question of whether the European Central Bank's (ECB) decision on the purchase of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) is compatible with EU primary law, it effectively forced the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) into a game of "chicken."
The fact that the FCC has made a reference to the CJEU for it to pronounce whether the European Central Bank's OMT decision is compatible with EU primary law is less remarkable than much of the press commentary suggests. While the FCC has never made a reference to the CJEU itself, it did not do so because the FCC required other courts to make references before the case reached the FCC. The FCC has interpreted Article 101 of the Basic Law that establishes the right of every person to her legally designated judge as requiring the highest national courts to make use of preliminary reference procedure 1 REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. 1955 ). In fact the game that Buzz challenges Jim to in that movie is called "chicken run" and is structured slightly differently: Both cars race towards an abyss and the "chicken" is the person who jumps out first. 
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under Art. 267 TFEU. Furthermore, even lower courts are required to make a reference to the CJEU before raising constitutional claims related to EU Law to the FCC. 4 The FCC's description of a relationship of cooperation with the CJEU has substance and is more than empty talk. That the FCC did not make a reference in the context of the Maastricht or Lisbon Treaty decisions is equally unsurprising, given that those Treaties had not yet entered into force, leaving the ECJ without jurisdiction. The court probably should have made a reference in the European Arrest Warrant case, 5 but at least formally that decision was focused on the German law implementing the EU Law Directive. So this is the first time that the FCC has actually made a reference to the CJEU. But in doctrinal terms the FCC merely implements the long established position that the CJEU must have an opportunity to pronounce on the question whether a European act is ultra vires, before the Constitutional Court makes its determination. Because the FCC is the first and only German court to hear the claim, it must make a reference both under Art. 267 TFEU and Art. 101 Basic Law, and it has done so here.
But of course that does not mean that the court has submitted itself to the authority of the CJEU. On the contrary, the FCC has already pronounced itself on how it sees the issues. It has not only provided reasons for its belief that the ECB's OMT policies are ultra vires. (There is nothing unusual in referring national courts or tribunals providing their views of an interpretative issue in the context of a reference.) The ordinary legal question of whether an EU act is or is not ultra vires is generally and uncontroversially left to the CJEU to decide. What the FCC, since its Maastricht decision, has insisted upon is that the CJEU itself is an actor that might act ultra vires in its interpretation of the EU's competencies. If an act, even an act held by the CJEU to be within the EU's competencies, is in fact determined by the FCC to be ultra vires in a specifically qualified way, then those acts are not constitutionally authorized under German law and thus not binding in Germany. 6 In Honeywell the FCC elaborated that such a qualified ultra vires act exists, when its ultra vires nature is evident and it leads to a structurally significant shift of competencies away from Member States. 7 In its reference to the CJEU the FCC has already determined that the Honeywell conditions are met in the case of the ECB's OMT decision. 7 Honeywell Decision at headnote 1(a).
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The FCC is playing a game of chicken using a pre-commitment strategy: The FCC and the CJEU both claim jurisdiction to assess as ultimate arbiters of constitutionality whether EU acts are within the EU's competencies and they want to avoid direct conflict. In the past the FCC's strategy has been to draw lines in the sand doctrinally ("you must not cross this line, we will defend it!") only to determine that the measures it was assessing met the relevant standards, thereby avoiding conflict. Procedurally the FCC has always insisted that because of its role as guardian of the national constitution, it was a relevant veto player that could insist on certain conditions limiting the authority of EU Law. But substantively it left everything standing as it was. For these reasons the FCC was described by some as the dog that barks but does not bite. 9 Now the FCC has shifted gear: It has provided an interpretation that establishes the ECB's OMT decision as a constitutionally qualified violation of EU Law (unless the policies were severely curtailed and limited to fit primary law) and then sent it to the CJEU to have that decision confirmed. Note that for all practical purposes the substantive decision has been made: These policies will not stand in their present form. Deference is only procedural-the CJEU is given the opportunity to successfully assert its role as the arbiter of the EU's competencies, but its decision will not be binding constitutionally in Germany, unless it follows parameters laid out by the FCC. The implicit message to the CJEU is clear: Either you play along and confirm our interpretation (chicken!), or there will be open constitutional conflict (the crash!).
II. How to Respond? The Options of the CJEU
So how might the CJEU respond? What might its strategy be in this game of chicken? There are four possible responses. First, the CJEU could refuse to play the game-it could hold the reference to be inadmissible. The ECB has not in fact acted yet under its declared policy, and the CJEU is not in the business of answering general hypothetical questions. It is unlikely, however, that the court will follow this path. It has in the past granted considerable leeway to national courts when determining whether a reference is admissible. When the reference is from a prominent court that in the past has been reluctant to make reference, the CJEU is likely to be even more disposed to engage the reference constructively. Furthermore it will not want the FCC to be able to claim that no adequate and effective legal protection against the concerns raised by the FCC is provided by the CJEU. So the court will probably play. But how will it respond? Second, it could straightforwardly reject the interpretation of the FCC and insist that the ECB's policies are within the ECB's mandate, thereby challenging the FCC to follow through on its threat. That would be a confrontational choice that would almost certainly lead to a direct confrontation, given the position articulated by the FCC in its reference. The CJEU is likely to shy away from this, if there are more promising options. Third, the court could follow
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Karlsruhe's Misguided Attempt 207 the interpretation provided by the FCC wholesale. That, however, is not very likely. The legal arguments presented by the FCC relating to the competencies issue, although analytically refined, subtle, and not obviously implausible, are not compelling. Plausible counterarguments, equally complex, are available and have been made (more about that below). In such a legal context other factors are likely to be decisive: The CJEU has historically seen itself as the motor of integration and has laboured extensively interpretatively to allow EU organs to expand their domain of action. (The recent Pringle decision 10 certainly does not undermine this description.) The policies declared by Draghi appear to be a remarkable success story. They succeeded to calm the markets and helped create a greater level of stability. This is a success story that the CJEU would have no interest to undermine.
Much more plausible and considerably more likely than any of the above options is a fourth option: The FCC has suggested that the ECB OMT policies could be interpreted in a way that would make it compatible with primary law.
11 For this to be the case, the OMT policies would have to be interpreted to ensure that they do not undermine European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) policies and have a merely supportive character for the EU's economic policies. The CJEU is likely to accept this general formula. It would do well, in particular, to emphasize the nexus to the ESM process. But there should be disagreement on the specific implications of the formula. The FCC has insisted that (1) losses on bond purchases have to be excluded (effectively this would probably require the ECB to ensure for itself preferred creditor status), (2) that there would have to be limits on the amount of debt purchased, and that (3) interference with the price mechanism should be avoided.
12 It would be risky for the CJEU to follow the FCC, given that it is not clear that fulfilling these requirements might not effectively gut the ECB's policies and render them ineffective. Under the circumstances it might be attractive for the CJEU to adopt the general formula, insisting in particular on connecting those OMT policies to the ESM procedure and ESM conditionality, but to refuse to provide any further specific restrictions. Whatever further restrictions might be derivable from the formula is to be worked out by the ECB in the design of its future policies and can then be challenged, if necessary, in future litigation. The CJEU would neither follow the FCC all the way, nor would it directly contradict it. It would leave key issues open. The CJEU would follow the FCC's formula, but refrain from giving it the severely constraining content the FCC is insisting on, instead granting deference to the ECB and kicking the can down the road.
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. But at this point the FCC has set itself up nicely to switch gears: It would introduce the eternity clause as an absolute limitation to European integration. Note that by the time the FCC will address the issue, it is likely to have already laid down a quite detailed basic framework. It can be expected that when the FCC hands down its substantive judgment on the ESM and Fiscal Compact this March that it will use the opportunity to provide an obiter dictum that insists that any interpretation of EU mechanisms and competencies effectively burdening Germany with risks of significant financial losses beyond those specifically agreed upon and signed off on by the German Parliament will be a step too far and effectively violate Germany's constitutional identity under Basic Law Art. 79 III. The court would effectively constitutionalize as part of Germany's constitutional identity central elements of the requirements it laid down for interpreting the Draghi policy for it to conform to EU primary law. If it did this, it would put more pressure on the CJEU to "chicken out" and fully conform to the FCC's requirements. A CJEU that adopted the position described above would not satisfy the FCC. So would this amount to the dreaded "crash"? What would the practical implications be?
On the one hand, the ECB has not acted on its policy yet-it has not engaged in any OMTs-and many hope that will remain so indefinitely. 13 If so, the conflict remains hypothetical. On the other hand, if the FCC establishes conditions that would delegitimize a particular future emergency bond-buying program by the ECB as incompatible with the German constitution, then German officials might find themselves under a constitutional duty to prevent it. This they could do, for example, by being obstructive in the context of the ESM procedure. With a strong nexus between that procedure and the ECB's bond buying policies, the possibility for German constitution-based obstruction grows.
Of course the dynamics might also go another way. Imagine a scenario where under pressure from capital markets and European colleagues, German officials are unable to resist pressure to support and coordinate with the ECB a major bond-buying program of a Member state in crisis. "German officials are undermining German constitutional identity,
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as established by the FCC!," some will shout outraged. But there might be a powerful response to that. Lawyers-and others-defending the actions of those German officials might well argue that the interpretations provided by the FCC in these judgments ought not to restrict their actions, because its judgments qualify as acts ultra vires: They clearly and obviously move beyond the boundaries of what can count as plausible interpretation of the German constitution, so they might claim. Implausible? Not in principle. Note how what appears to be scandalous in such an assertion is just the mirror image of the doctrinal constructions used by the FCC with regard to the actions of EU judges. What is sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander. 14 The question is whether the FCC's approach to these issues is a defensible interpretation of the German constitution or whether it might plausibly be seen as an act ultra vires that would require German officials to ignore it.
C. Rebel Without a Good Cause: At What Point Would Karlsruhe be Acting Ultra Vires?
The judges writing for the majority claim to have a sound constitutional cause: Ultra vires review has its grounds in the FCC's duty to safeguard democracy and a meaningful right to vote. In the background, and, as we have seen, looming quite large as a central piece of the overall puzzle, is the constitutional identity protected by the German Basic Law's so called "eternity clause" in Art. 79 III. So why are the FCC's constitutional claims deeply misguided?
I. Constitutional Identity and Absolute Limits of Integration
I will start with the claim that German constitutional identity clause can be plausibly brought into play as an absolute limit to integration. This was, of course, not an issue highlighted in the reference that the court has made. But the first point to make here is that it should have been. The FCC explicitly stated that it might very well later on have to assess whether the interpretation provided by the ECJ affects the guarantees under the eternity clause. 15 Given that what will be at issue then are the contours of the constitutional identity guarantee of Art. 4 TEU as embodied in Basic Law Art. 79 III, the invocation of constitutional identity necessarily raises questions of interpretation of EU Law on which the FCC ought to make a reference to the CJEU, before it makes its 14 Armin von Bogdandy and his team in Heidelberg have brought into the discussion the idea of a European "reverse Solange" doctrine. It might be worthwhile to also consider the introduction of a "reverse ultra vires" doctrine. It would function as a check to allow the CJEU to interpret and check whether national actors, including national courts, have provided a plausible interpretation of their constitutional identity under Art. 4 TEU, or whether their interpretation constitutes an act ultra vires incompatible with the shared principles of constitutionalism under Art. 2 TEU. Mirroring Honeywell such an act might be ultra vires, if it is clearly and evidently not compatible with a plausible interpretation of Art. 2 values or it places unreasonable burdens on the attainment of common European objectives.
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determination. 16 If the Court were to invoke Art. 79 III Basic Law when the case comes back from Luxembourg, it would have to make another reference to the CJEU, given that it has not done so in its first reference.
But quite apart from these procedural points, if the above description of the state of play is correct, substantive arguments surrounding constitutional identity are likely to move to the foreground very quickly, both when the court hands down its final judgment of the ESM and Fiscal Compact later on this March and when the FCC eventually responds to the ECJ's opinion. The focal point is likely to be the possibility of considerable losses on bond purchases by the ECB and its fiscal implications for Germany. If the ECB's claim to be able to incur such risks with potentially considerable fiscal implications for Germany qualifies as an infringement of the constitutional identity of the democratic state, this would have severe consequences: Merkel's coalition government could not simply initiate Treaty reforms and introduce provisions that specifically authorize the ECB to purchase such bonds, that the Bundestag could ratify later on. Even an ordinary amendment of the constitution would not save such reforms. Under conventional constitutional wisdom, an act of constituent power would be required. What this amounts to is procedurally not entirely clear, but it would have to be an act that qualifies as an act of constituent power, 17 which would probably require a referendum.
But is it plausible to read Art. 79 III that way? Does the guarantee of democratic statehood really preclude significant further steps of financial integration? I do not think such an argument is plausible. In the following I will seek to approach the issue as a simple question of conventional legal analysis, undertaken lege artis by engaging the conventional canons of constitutional interpretation. Nothing in the following is original, it has been said before. But it has to be repeated again, so that it is not drowned out by the court's misguided persistence since its Maastrich decision in 1991. Only frequent repetition, not careful analysis or argument, sustains the foundations of the court's current approach. There is no reason not to insist that it changes course.
To begin with a simple semantic point: Even if European competencies extended to include full-fledged taxing powers, would that mean that Germany no longer qualified as a democratic state? Of course not. States do not stop being states by giving up considerable powers and subjecting themselves to more extensive legal and political communities. Bavaria and Texas have not stopped being democratic states, just because they exercise taxing powers concurrently with federal governments. Not surprisingly this kind of argument has, as far as I can see, not been raised by a single other court in any of the other
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26 EU jurisdictions. This invites a second important point: The court's lack of use of comparative arguments. Given that the court is interpreting the meaning of the universal idea of democratic statehood, a concept that is part of the shared constitutional heritage of Member States and not an idiosyncratic national commitment, why does it not engage in any serious way the jurisprudence of other Member States courts on this point? The answer, of course, is that no other state and no other court has raised a similar concern. But that is a legally relevant fact in a community held together in part by a shared constitutional heritage. It is a grave failure of judicial hermeneutics in such a context not to reflect on and engage the comparative practice, or the lack of it. It should raise suspicion that only the German Constitutional Court provides an interpretation of democratic statehood precluding further financial integration. Could it be that reference to universal legal concepts mask national interests or populist inclinations? The argument becomes even more untenable in light of the specific historical context of the German constitution. The Basic Law was generated at the behest of the occupying powers after WWII and required their consent, before it could enter into force. Germany was not a sovereign state then and so, not surprisingly, there is no reference to sovereignty anywhere in the constitution. 18 Endowing the concept of democratic statehood with competencies traditionally associated with sovereignty would be misguided in the context of the German constitution. On the other hand, at the time of its negotiation, ambitious ideas about a united Europe were part of the political debates. That is why a united Europe has, from the beginning, been featured as a reference point in the Preamble of the Constitution and, after reunification, also in Art. 23 of the Constitution. It is unthinkable that in such a context anyone would have imagined that the guarantee of democratic statehood as laid down in the Basic Law would preclude integration even in federalized European structures. Given the reference to a united Europe and the absence of any mention of sovereignty, there is also a strong systematic argument against such a reading. What follows from all of this is that the universalist principles at the heart of German constitutional identity cannot plausibly be marshaled against the transfer of competencies on the European level, when the transfer and exercise of such competencies is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity and the exercise of European public powers itself meets democratic standards. An ambitious German Constitutional Court seeking to have its voice heard as part of the choir of European constitutional courts might well be inclined to critically assess and work out what these principles commitments might amount to. But the Art. 79 III of the Basic Law provides no basis for the kind of statist recalcitrance that has informed the FCC's interpretation of the concept of democratic statehood since its post-reunification Maastricht judgment.
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II. Ultra Vires Review
The arguments for engaging in ultra vires review of European Union acts on the grounds of protecting the individual's right to vote are also ill conceived. The argument seems simple enough: If all authority exercised on German territory has to be derived from the German people, then the grounds for the application of EU Law in Germany is the act of ratification, involving German public authorities and the Bundestag specifically. If institutions established under the Treaty seek to expand their authority beyond what is conferred on them they act ultra vires, the link between the people and the actions of those authorities is severed and its legitimacy impinged. Of course the CJEU is tasked to ensure that that does not happen, but the CJEU is itself an actor that can act ultra vires when it effectively amends the Treaty under the guise of interpreting it. Some degree of deference is to be given to the CJEU, but the limits of that deference are to be determined by the FCC and have been defined in its Honeywell decision.
Here it must suffice to lay out very briefly (1) why such a framework is not plausible and even if it were, (2) why its concrete application is misguided.
Ultra Vires Review is not Plausible
The basic premise of this construction is that all public authority claimed by the laws has to be derived from authorizations of "We the People" either through their constitution or through legislation. But of course it is not at all obvious why that should be so. Why should "We the People" be thought of as having original authority to determine whether and to what extent national policies inflict harms on outsiders, whether this concerns foreign policy, environmental degradation, or economic discrimination? It is simply an unstated and deeply implausible presumption to think of "We the People" on any territory to be in authority with regard to all of the laws that govern them, given that the purpose of many of them is to ensure that states do not unjustly inflict harm on one another. 19 International law is not based on state consent. 20 If we sometimes say otherwise, we mean it in much the same way as when we say that domestic law is based on the consent of citizens. Many international laws are binding on states without having consented to them, much like many laws are binding on citizens, even if they opposed them. Yes, Member States are part of the European Union in virtue of having consented to it. But that does not give them the authority to determine unilaterally whether acts emanating from the institutions of the European Union are to be regarded as binding or not. 21 There may have been times when
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it was justified for a Member State court to set aside legislation on the grounds that it violated human rights as interpreted by a domestic constitutional court. Such authority may be claimed exceptionally, when the law of the larger legal order suffers from some structural defects-for example the lack of meaningful human rights review. 22 Similarly, if there were no adequate safeguard against usurpation of powers by EU actors, then structural deficits might well be compensated by subsidiary review by national institutions. But at this point it is not clear whether there is a competence-related structural deficit. 23 True, the CJEU as the guardian of the Treaties has historically played the role of a motor of integration. 24 As such it played a constitutionally constructive role to occasionally overcome collective action problems of Member States to more clearly provide the EU with the competencies it needed to fulfill its politically desired function. The general interpretative approach to competencies by the CJEU has been justified persuasively with reference to the overall point and structure of the EU's constitution. Of course there have also been individual bad decisions. How could that not be? But the CJEU not only has jurisdiction to review whether acts of the EU are ultra vires, it has struck down EU acts on that ground a number of times in the past decade. 25 There is no justification for claiming a structural deficit that might authorize subsidiary review powers by national actors. Fears are more appropriately focused on temptations by national actors, including national courts, to use ultra vires arguments to score populist points in situations where politically salient national interests are in play. The powers and biases potentially pushing national constitutional courts to unduly block and sabotage EU actions may turn out to be more forceful than any powers and biases potentially pushing the CJEU to act in favor of expanding EU powers.
